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A question of growing importance in the corporate governance debate is shareholder 
engagement in listed companies, and in a legal context, what regulatory interventions that 
can be made to increase shareholder engagement. This thesis examines this question in 
relation to the regulation of takeovers, with the purpose of analysing how the takeover-rules 
affect the conditions for shareholder engagement in listed companies.
The author first analyses the functions of the shareholders in corporate governance, as 
intended by the rulemaker. Six functions are identified: voting on the general meeting, 
general monitoring of the board, monitoring management remuneration, overseeing related 
party transaction, engaging in dialogue with the board and, when applicable, adapting 
governance to the required level of entrepreneurialism. The author then identifies five 
antecedents for shareholders to exercise these functions: sufficiently large holdings in 
individual companies, sufficient large holdings in relation to the shareholders’ equity 
portfolios, adequate knowledge for shareholder engagement as well as an organisation that 
allows engagement, that shareholders can acquire compensation for the costs of 
engagement, and that there is a sufficiently well-functioning market for corporate control. 
Based on these antecedents, an analysis of whether the takeover-rules have a negative 
impact on shareholder engagement is presented. The conclusion is that the mandatory bid 
rule and the restrictive rules on premiums for superior voting shares can be assumed to have 
a negative impact on shareholder engagement. 
The mandatory bid rule and the rules on premiums for superior voting shares are then 
analysed from a contractarian perspective. The conclusion of this analysis is that while the 
rules on mandatory bids as well as restrictions on voting premiums seem to be in line with 
the principles of company law, and therefore from a contractarian perspective are in line 
with the protection that shareholders in a company can reasonably expect to receive, there is 
room to soften the rules to facilitate shareholder engagement without risking to undermine 
the purpose of the capital market regulation by increasing the threshold for the mandatory 
bid rule to 40 percent, and by allowing limited premiums for superior voting shares.
Keywords: shareholder engagement, controlling  shareholders, takeovers, corporate 
governance, law and economics, mandatory bids, equal treatment of shareholders 
Erik Lidman, University of Gothenburg, School of Business, Economics and Law, Box 650, 
SE-405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden, www.law.gu.se 
